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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Tsilhqot’in and Grassy Narrows decisions represent an about-face in the 
Supreme Court’s approach to the constitutional division of powers.1 Prior to 2014, 
the Court consistently confirmed the continuing relevance and importance of the 
doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity in regards to section 91(24) of the 
Constitution Act, 1867 and the federal Crown’s responsibilities with respect to 
Aboriginal and treaty rights. 2  In Tsilhqot’in and Grassy Narrows the Court 
disregarded existing law and dramatically reduced the federal government’s role 
when a province proposes to undertake activity that could negatively affect 
Aboriginal and treaty rights. The Court held that it is now open to provinces to 
consult and attempt to justify infringements of those rights pursuant to the 
Sparrow/Badger analysis. The potential ramifications of the Court’s departure from 
established case law are considerable. The decisions call into question the Court’s 
approach to the division of powers by reducing an established aspect of 
constitutional protection formerly guaranteed to Indigenous Peoples. As a result, 
provinces now have significantly expanded jurisdiction to make decisions which 
impact Aboriginal and treaty rights.  
This paper provides an analysis of the current state of the law on the 
division of powers as it relates to the protection of Aboriginal and treaty rights. Part 
One outlines the law in respect of section 91(24) and the operation of the doctrine of 
interjurisdictional immunity prior to 2014. Part Two provides an overview of 
Tsilhqot’in and Grassy Narrows, with a focus on the division of powers in relation to 
federal authority pursuant to section 91(24). Part Three analyzes the implications of 
the province’s significantly expanded jurisdiction since Tsilhqot’in and Grassy 
Narrows to infringe Aboriginal and treaty rights. 
  
                                                
*  Bruce McIvor holds a Ph.D. in environmental and Aboriginal history and is a Fulbright Scholar. Kate 
Gunn will be entering the LL.M. program at the University of British Columbia in September 2016. 
They both practice law at First Peoples Law Corporation. 
1  Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia, 2014 SCC 44, [2014] 2 SCR 256 [Tsilhqot’in]; Grassy Narrows 
First Nation v Ontario (Natural Resources), 2014 SCC 48, [2014] 2 SCR 447 [Grassy Narrows]. 
Thanks to Jay Nelson, Robert Janes QC and the UNBLJ’s editors and anonymous reviewers for their 
insightful comments on drafts of this article. 
2  Unless expressly indicated, references in this article to Aboriginal rights should be read as inclusive of 
Aboriginal title. 
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II. DIVISION OF POWERS PRIOR TO TSILHQOT’IN AND GRASSY NARROWS 
 
Prior to the Supreme Court’s 2014 decisions in Tsilhqot’in and Grassy Narrows a 
well-established body of case law confirmed the Court’s long-standing approach to 
the constitutional division of powers and in particular federal responsibility for the 
protection of Aboriginal and treaty rights. The law was relatively settled—Canada 
bore exclusive responsibility for regulating Aboriginal and treaty rights pursuant to 
section 91(24) and the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity operated to protect 
the federal government’s exclusive role from provincial interference.  
A. Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction pursuant to Section 91(24) 
The federal government’s exclusive role pursuant to section 91(24) to protect and 
regulate Aboriginal and treaty rights has deep roots in Canada’s constitutional 
history and the federal Crown’s unique relationship with Indigenous Peoples which 
predates confederation. Since the fall of New France, the British preferred to employ 
a single, uniform ‘national’ policy on issues related to Indigenous Peoples. The 
British had long believed that local non-Aboriginal legislative assemblies were 
adverse to Indigenous Peoples’ interests and that ‘settler majorities’ in provincial 
legislatures would be tempted to run roughshod over Aboriginal rights and encroach 
on established reserves.3 In its 1837 Report of the Select Committee on Aborigines 
(British Settlements) the English House of Commons reiterated the potential 
problem: 
The protection of the Aborigines should be considered a duty particularly 
belonging and appropriate to the executive government, as administered 
either in this country or by the governors of the respective colonies. This is 
not a trust which could conveniently be confided to the local legislatures. 
In proportion as those bodies are qualified for the right discharge of their 
proper functions, they will be unfit for the performance of this office. For 
a local legislature, if properly constituted, should partake largely in the 
interests, and represent the feelings or the settled opinions of the great 
mass of the people for whom they act. But the settlers in almost every 
colony, having either disputes to adjust with the native tribes, or claims to 
urge against them, the representative body is virtually a party, and 
therefore ought not to be the judge in such controversies…. Whatever may 
be the legislative system in any colony, we therefore advise that, as far as 
possible, the Aborigines be withdrawn from its control.4 
                                                
3  Peter W Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada vol 1 (Toronto: Carswell, 1997) (loose-leaf revision 
2014) at 28-2. 
4  Great Britain, Select Committee on Aborigines (British Settlements) (House of Commons Parliamentary 
Papers no 425) (London: The Aborigines Protection Society, 1837) at 117 [emphasis added]. Ten years 
later, the Legislative Assembly of Upper Canada came to a similar conclusion: see See Douglas 
Sanders, “Prior Claims: Aboriginal People in the Constitution of Canada,” in Stanley M Beck & Ivan 
Bernier, eds, Canada and the New Constitution: The Unfinished Agenda, vol 1 (Montreal: Institute for 
Research on Public Policy, 1983) 225. 
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These concerns became central to the underlying structure of Canada’s 
Constitution. As Peter Hogg explains, one of the driving rationales for Parliament’s 
constitutional responsibility for Indigenous Peoples was “concern for the protection 
of the [A]boriginal peoples against local settlers.”5 By virtue of section 91(24), “the 
federal government was placed between First Nations and future settlers”6 to ensure 
the protection of Indigenous interests from encroaching local populations. At the 
time of the enactment of the Constitution Act, 1867, the “distinct constitutional 
status” of Indigenous Peoples was recognized through section 91(24), which 
provided the federal government with exclusive jurisdiction in respect of “Indians, 
and lands reserved for the Indians.”7 The newly-formed Constitution guaranteed 
“political spaces to the founding cultural groups” of the Canadian state, including 
Indigenous Peoples, and in so doing “sought to respect to the right to culture 
difference” between those respective groups.”8  
More recently, the Supreme Court in Reference re Secession of Quebec 
emphasized the connection between section 91(24) and the relationship between 
Indigenous Peoples and the federal Crown. The Court noted that a constitution 
should “ensure that vulnerable minority groups are endowed with the institutions and 
rights necessary to maintain and promote their identities against the assimilative 
pressures of the majority.”9 The federal government’s responsibility to protect the 
rights of Indigenous Peoples, including the “special commitments made to them by 
successive governments” was therefore reflective of “an important underlying 
constitutional value” in Canadian society.10  
Up until Tsilhqot’in and Grassy Narrows in 2014, the Supreme Court 
continued to confirm that in the modern context federal exclusivity pursuant to 
section 91(24) was justified because of the “special position of [A]boriginal peoples 
in Canadian society”.11 For example, the Court in Derrickson held that provisions of 
the British Columbia Family Relations Act on the division of family property were 
inapplicable to reserve lands because “[t]he right to possession of lands on an Indian 
reserve is manifestly of the very essence of the federal exclusive legislative power 
under s. 91(24)”.12 Similarly, in Paul the Supreme Court held that provincial family 
                                                
5  Hogg, supra note 3 at 28-2, cited in Tsilhqot'in Nation v British Columbia, 2007 BCSC 1700 at para 
1008, [2008] 1 CNLR 112. 
6  James Youngblood Henderson, Treaty Rights in the Constitution of Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 2007) 
at 466. 
7  Bruce Ryder, “The Demise and Rise of the Classical Paradigm in Canadian Federalism: Promoting 
Autonomy for the Provinces and the First Nations” (1991) 36 McGill LJ 308 at 362. 
8  Ibid. 
9  Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 SCR 217 at para 74, 161 DLR (4th) 385. 
10 Ibid at para 82. 
11 Canadian Western Bank v Alberta, 2007 SCC 22 at para 61, [2007] 2 SCR 3 [Canadian Western Bank]. 
12 Derrickson v Derrickson, [1986] 1 SCR 285 at 296, 26 DLR (4th) 175 [Derrickson]. 
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law could not govern the disposition of matrimonial homes on reserve.13 In each 
case, the Court concluded that matters which were “absolutely indispensable and 
essential” to the cultural survival of Indigenous Peoples fell within the federal 
government’s exclusive jurisdiction pursuant to the division of powers.14  
The federal Crown’s responsibilities pursuant to section 91(24) are far from 
a vestige from an earlier time in Canada’s colonial history. Rather, prior to 2014, 
courts and scholars alike recognized exclusive federal jurisdiction to regulate 
Aboriginal and treaty rights as a central tenet of Canada’s constitutional obligations 
based on the federal Crown’s unique history and continued relationship with 
Indigenous Peoples. In Tsilhqot’in and Grassy Narrows the Court abruptly 
abandoned this understanding and in so doing disregarded the historical and current 
importance of the federal Crown’s constitutional responsibilities pursuant to section 
91(24).  
Notably, post-2014, the Supreme Court has emphasized a different 
underlying purpose to section 91(24). In 2016, the Court in Daniels described section 
91(24) as central to colonization and the control of Indigenous Peoples.15 As the 
Court explained, assigning the Crown’s law-making authority to the federal 
government facilitated Canada’s westward expansion, including the development of 
policies intended to prevent Indigenous Peoples from resisting settlement of their 
lands.16 The Court’s emphasis on section 91(24)’s role in facilitating westward 
expansion and federal authority over Indigenous Peoples is a departure from the 
Court’s previous focus on the importance of section 91(24) in respect of protecting 
vulnerable minorities from the pressures of settler society. 
B. Ongoing Relevance of Interjurisdictional Immunity 
Up to 2014, the federal government’s exclusive responsibility with respect to 
Aboriginal and treaty rights pursuant to section 91(24) was protected through the 
constitutional doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity, along with other 
constitutional doctrines such as paramountcy. Part of the division of powers, the 
doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity holds that there exists a “basic, minimum 
and unassailable content” for classes of subjects or heads of power under sections 91 
and 92 that is immune from the application of the other level of government’s 
legislation because they constitute an integral and vital part of either level of 
government’s legislative authority.17 As such, if the incidental effects of valid 
legislation of one level of government result in an unacceptable interference with the 
core competence of an area within the exclusive jurisdiction of the other level of 
                                                
13 Paul v Paul, [1986] 1 SCR 306, 26 DLR (4th) 196 [Paul]. 
14 Canadian Western Bank, supra note 11 at para 61. 
15 Daniels v Canada (Indian Affairs and Northern Development), 2016 SCC 12 at para 25 [Daniels]. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Canadian Western Bank, supra note 11 at paras 33–34. 
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government, based on the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity, the legislation is 
inapplicable to the extent of the interference.18 
While the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity has been the subject of 
criticism, in recent years the Supreme Court repeatedly recognized it as a necessary 
tool to preserve the intention of the framers of the Constitution that as between the 
federal government and the provinces, certain legislative powers are exclusive.19 For 
example, in Canadian Western Bank the Court held that “the text and logic of our 
federal structure justifies the application of interjurisdictional immunity to certain 
federal “activities” and that interjurisdictional immunity was therefore 
“supported both textually and by the principles of federalism.”20 Although the Court 
held that it did not favour an “intensive reliance on the doctrine,” it nevertheless 
recognized that interjurisdictional immunity would continue to have a “proper part 
to play in appropriate circumstances.”21 The Court in Lafarge similarly held that 
“there are circumstances in which the powers of one level of government must be 
protected against intrusions, even incidental ones, by the other level.”22 In COPA, the 
Court again confirmed the ongoing importance and applicability of the doctrine of 
interjurisdictional immunity, stating that: 
Among the reasons for rejecting a challenge to the existence of the 
doctrine is that the text of the Constitution Act, 1867, itself refers to 
exclusivity: Canadian Western Bank, at para. 34. The doctrine of 
interjurisdictional immunity has been criticized, but has not been removed 
from the federalism analysis. The more appropriate response is the one 
articulated in Canadian Western Bank and Lafarge Canada: the doctrine 
remains part of Canadian law but in a form constrained by principle and 
precedent. In this way, it balances the need for intergovernmental 
flexibility with the need for predictable results in areas of core federal 
authority.23 
The Supreme Court has continued to recognize the role of interjurisdictional 
immunity in recent decisions, including in 2011 in PHS Community Services Society 
and again in 2013 in Marine Services.24 In PHS Community Services Society, the 
Court expressly acknowledged that “while the doctrine of interjurisdictional 
immunity has been narrowed, it has not been abolished” and that the “recognition of 
                                                
18 Quebec (Attorney General) v Canadian Owners and Pilots Association, 2010 SCC 39 at paras 39, 63, 
[2010] 2 SCR 536 [COPA]; Canadian Western Bank, supra note 11 at paras 48–49. 
19 Canadian Western Bank, supra note 11 at para 32. 
20 Ibid at paras 33, 42. 
21 Ibid at para 47. 
22 British Columbia (Attorney General) v Lafarge Canada Inc, 2007 SCC 23 at para 41, [2007] 2 SCR 86 
[Lafarge], citing Canadian Western Bank, supra note 11 at para 32. 
23 COPA, supra note 18 at para 58. 
24 Canada (AG) v PHS Community Services Society, 2011 SCC 44, [2011] 3 SCR 134 [PHS Community 
Services Society]; Marine Services International Ltd v Ryan Estate, 2013 SCC 44, [2013] 3 SCR 53. 
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previously established exclusive cores of power” would therefore continue to play a 
role in the proper functioning of the division of powers.25  
The relevance and importance of interjurisdictional immunity was also 
acknowledged specifically in regards to the exclusive federal authority pursuant to 
section 91(24). For example, in Delgamuukw, the Court confirmed that the core of 
section 91(24) “encompasses [A]boriginal rights, including the rights that are 
recognized and affirmed by s. 35(1).”26 As such, “s. 91(24) protects a core federal 
jurisdiction even from provincial laws of general application, through the operation 
of the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity.”27 The Court later confirmed that in 
the context of section 91(24), interjurisdictional immunity would be triggered where 
provincial legislation purported to “regulate indirectly matters within exclusive 
federal competence, that is, to alter rights and obligations.”28 A provincial law that 
impairs the “basic, minimum and unassailable content” of the federal power over 
“Indians” in section 91(24) would be rendered inapplicable to the extent of the 
impairment.29  As a result, although the Court had placed strict limits around the 
applicability of interjurisdictional immunity by 2014, its ongoing relevance and 
purpose in respect of upholding the division of powers was clear. The Court 
repeatedly recognized that interjurisdictional immunity has had and would continue 
to play an important role in the protection of specific heads of power, including 
federal legislative powers under section 91(24). 
C. Consultation & Justification under Section 35 
The Court’s decision to narrow the federal government’s exclusive jurisdiction 
pursuant to section 91(24) in Tsilhqot’in and Grassy Narrows has the potential to 
significantly affect how the Crown fulfils its obligations to Indigenous Peoples in 
respect of Aboriginal and treaty rights pursuant to section 35 of the Constitution Act, 
1982. It is settled law that the Crown is obligated to consult and accommodate 
Indigenous Peoples where it contemplates actions or decisions which could affect 
Indigenous Peoples’ section 35 rights.30  Where the Crown proposes an action that 
would result in a prima facie infringement of an Aboriginal or treaty right, it must go 
beyond consultation and take the necessary steps to justify the infringement in 
                                                
25 PHS Community Services Society, supra note 24 at para 65. 
26 Delgamuukw v British Columbia, [1997] 3 SCR 1010 at para 178, 153 DLR (4th) 193 [Delgamuukw]; 
see also Kent McNeil, “Aboriginal Title and the Division of Powers: Rethinking Federal and Provincial 
Jurisdiction” (1998) 61 Sask L Rev 431. 
27 Delgamuukw, supra note 26 at para 181. 
28 Paul v British Columbia (Forest Appeals Commission), 2003 SCC 55 at para 19, [2003] 2 SCR 585; see 
also R v Morris, 2006 SCC 59, [2006] 2 SCR 915 [Morris] in relation to treaty rights. 
29 See NIL/TU,O Child and Family Services Society v BC Government and Service Employees' Union, 
2010 SCC 45 at paras 70–1, [2010] 2 SCR 696 in respect of section 91(24) and matters relating to the 
“status and rights of Indians.” 
30 Haida Nation v British Columbia (Minister of Forests), 2004 SCC 73, [2004] 3 SCR 511. 
152 UNBLJ     RD UN-B [VOL/TOME 67 
 
accordance with the principles set out by the Supreme Court in Sparrow and 
Badger.31  
The question of whether provinces are entitled to justify infringements of 
section 35 rights that fall within federal exclusivity pursuant to section 91(24) was 
initially the subject of conflicting jurisprudence.32 For example, in 1985 in Simon the 
Court confirmed that section 91(24) immunized treaty rights from provincial 
regulation. 33 There followed a series of contradictory judgments on provincial 
authority to infringe section 35 rights, beginning with the Supreme Court’s 1996 
decision in Côté.34  In that case, Lamer CJ cast doubt on the Court’s previous 
jurisprudence on section 91(24) as protecting treaty rights from interference by 
provincial legislatures in the course of analyzing whether the provincial regulation in 
question acceptably restricted the treaty right to fish. Lamer CJ went on to address 
the question of whether the justification analysis for section 35 rights applied to both 
provincial and federal laws and held that: 
…it is quite clear that the Sparrow test applies where a provincial law is 
alleged to have infringed an [A]boriginal or treaty right in a manner which 
cannot be justified: Badger … (application of Sparrow test to provincial 
statute which violated a treaty right). The text and purpose of s. 35(1) do 
not distinguish between federal and provincial laws which restrict 
[A]boriginal or treaty rights, and they should both be subject to the same 
standard of constitutional scrutiny.35 
A year later in Delgamuukw Lamer CJ added to the growing confusion by referring 
to his earlier analysis in Côté, stating “[t]he [A]boriginal rights recognized and 
affirmed by s. 35(1), including [A]boriginal title, are not absolute. Those rights may 
be infringed, both by the federal (e.g., Sparrow) and provincial (e.g., Côté) 
governments.”36 He then enumerated various examples of government objectives 
which, in proper circumstances, the Crown might be able to prove are justifiable 
infringements of Aboriginal title. In so doing, however, Lamer CJ failed to explain 
how a province’s supposed power to infringe section 35 rights could be reconciled 
with the limits on provinces’ property interests under the Constitution Act, 1867.37 
His discussion also ignored the fact that if provinces have no constitutional authority 
                                                
31 R v Sparrow, [1990] 1 SCR 1075, 70 DLR (4th) 385) [Sparrow]; R v Badger, [1996] 1 SCR 771, 133 DLR 
(4th) 324 [Badger]. 
32 See Kerry Wilkins, “Of Provinces and Section 35 Rights” (1999) 22 Dal LJ 185; Kathryn L Kickbush & 
Debbie Chan, “Provincial Jurisdiction to Infringe Aboriginal Rights” (2005) 63 The Advocate 881. 
33 R v Simon, [1985] 2 SCR 387 at 411, 71 NSR (2d) 15. 
34 R v Côté, [1996] 3 SCR 139, 138 DLR (4th) 385. 
35 Ibid at para 74 [citations omitted]. 
36 Delgamuukw, supra note 26 at para 160.  
37 The apparent conflict between the SCC’s decision in Delgamuukw and its section 91(24) jurisprudence 
was immediately recognized by legal scholars: see e.g. Nigel Bankes, “Delgamuukw, Division of 
Powers and Provincial Land and Resource Laws: Some Implications for Provincial Resource Rights” 
(1998) 32 UBCL Rev 317 and McNeil, supra note 26 at 450. 
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to infringe Aboriginal rights as a result of section 91(24), no justification is 
possible.38 Finally, in 2002 the Court in Kitkatla appeared to confirm the provinces’ 
ancillary authority to legislate in respect of section 35, provided that the effect on 
Aboriginal rights was incidental and the rights at issue had not yet been established.39 
The result was further erosion of the ability of section 91(24) to operate as an 
“efficient shield to protect Aboriginal peoples from the application of provincial 
legislation.”40 
Notwithstanding the Court’s apparent willingness to entertain the possibility 
of justifiable provincial interference with Aboriginal and treaty rights, in 2006 the 
Court in Morris ultimately confirmed that provinces were not at liberty to infringe 
treaty rights. In Morris, the Court held that “[t]he purpose of the Sparrow/Badger 
analysis is to determine whether an infringement by a government acting within its 
constitutionally mandated powers can be justified. This justification analysis does 
not alter the division of powers, which is dealt with in s. 88.”41 Accordingly, the 
infringement/justification analysis from Sparrow and Badger would apply wherever 
there was a prima facie infringement of a treaty right, and the federal government 
bore exclusive responsibility to justify the infringement pursuant to the division of 
powers. While Morris applied specifically to treaty rights, the clear implication was 
that all rights protected by section 35, including Aboriginal title and Aboriginal 
rights, where protected from provincial legislation by the division of powers. 
Since Morris the question of which level of government was responsible for 
fulfilling the Crown’s section 35 obligations could be determined through a 
straightforward application of the division of powers. Based on the division of 
powers, only the government with the proper constitutional authority to regulate 
Aboriginal and treaty rights had the corresponding authority to justify contemplated 
decisions or actions that had the potential to affect those rights. When faced with 
provincial legislation which would affect Aboriginal and treaty rights, the initial 
underlying question was therefore whether the provincial legislation constituted an 
unacceptable interference with the federal government’s exclusive jurisdiction 
pursuant to section 91(24). If it did, the law would be rendered constitutionally 
inapplicable to the extent of the interference. Where the law was inapplicable, the 
province could not seek to justify interference with the right. To approach the issue 
otherwise would result in the illogical conclusion that a provincial government could 
justify an effect on an Aboriginal or treaty right resulting from constitutionally 
inapplicable legislation. 
Despite earlier confusion, as of 2014 the Court had clarified that Indigenous 
Peoples were entitled to rely on the established operation of the division of powers to 
                                                
38 McNeil, supra note 26 at 452. 
39 Kitkatla Band v British Columbia (Minister of Small Business, Tourism and Culture), 2002 SCC 31, 
[2002] 2 SCR 146. See also Jean Leclair, “The Kitkatla Decision: Finding Jurisdictional Room to 
Justify Provincial Regulation of Aboriginal Matters” (2003) 21 SCLR (2d) 73 at 88.  
40 Leclair, supra note 39 at 73. 
41 Morris, supra note 28 at para 55 [emphasis added]. 
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prevent provinces from acting outside of their constitutional sphere and attempting to 
justify infringements of Aboriginal and treaty rights absent constitutional authority. 
As will be discussed, however, in Tsilhqot’in and then Grassy Narrows the Court 
narrowed the federal government’s exclusive constitutional responsibility for the 
regulation of Aboriginal and treaty rights. The corresponding increase in provincial 
authority—including provincial access to justification measures under Sparrow/ 
Badger—raises serious questions about the ability of Indigenous Peoples to exercise 
their section 35 rights absent federal protection. 
III. TSILHQOT’IN AND GRASSY NARROWS 
A. The Tsilhqot’in Decision 
1. Background  
The Tsilhqot’in litigation originated 20 years prior to the Supreme Court decision as 
a challenge by members of the Tsilhqot’in Nation to provincial decisions authorizing 
forestry activities in lands traditionally used and occupied by the Tsilhqot’in people. 
After a five-year trial, the trial judge at the British Columbia Supreme Court 
concluded that the Tsilhqot’in held Aboriginal rights in the claimed area and that 
those rights had been unjustifiably infringed by the provincial authorizations.42 The 
trial judge went on to find that there was sufficient evidence of occupation by the 
Tsilhqot’in to support a claim for Aboriginal title over certain parts of the claimed 
area, but declined to issue a declaration of Aboriginal title for procedural reasons. 
The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court’s decision that the provincial approvals 
had unjustifiably infringed the Tsilhqot’in’s Aboriginal rights. However, based on a 
restrictive approach to Aboriginal title that required evidence of intensive use and 
occupation of specific sites, the Court of Appeal found that the Tsilhqot’in had failed 
to establish Aboriginal title in the claimed area. The Tsilhqot’in appealed the 
decision on the issue of Aboriginal title to the Supreme Court.  
2. Submissions on the Division of Powers 
A significant related issue to the question of whether the Tsilhqot’in held Aboriginal 
title to the claimed area was whether provincial laws of general application would 
apply to Aboriginal title lands and whether a valid provincial law could ever 
justifiably infringe an Aboriginal right. At the Supreme Court, the Tsilhqot’in argued 
that the province did not have constitutional authority to infringe Aboriginal rights, 
and that as such the provincial forestry legislation at issue could not constitutionally 
                                                
42 In reaching this conclusion, the Court applied the prevailing principles of constitutional law and agreed 
with the Tsilhqot’in that the Province had no constitutional jurisdiction to infringe Aboriginal title or 
rights (although the Court ultimately concluded that section 88 of the Indian Act invigorated provincial 
laws that infringed the former). 
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apply to authorize timber harvesting activities on Aboriginal title lands.43 The 
Tsilhqot’in based their argument on the principle that Aboriginal rights are at the 
core of the federal government’s exclusive jurisdiction pursuant section 91(24) and 
interjurisdictional immunity would prevent the province from impairing the core of 
federal jurisdiction, including through legislation which would affect Aboriginal title 
lands. 44  Consequently, the Tsilhqot’in argued that pursuant to the doctrine of 
interjurisdictional immunity, the province could not “impair the core of federal 
jurisdictional even through the incidental effects of otherwise valid laws of general 
application” and provincial legislation would therefore be inapplicable to the extent 
that it impaired the core of exclusive federal jurisdiction.45 
3. The Decision 
Upholding the findings of the trial judge, the Supreme Court made the first 
declaration of Aboriginal title in Canadian history. The Court recognized that while 
the issue of whether and how provincial laws would apply to title lands was not 
necessary for the disposition of the appeal, it was nevertheless of importance to the 
Tsilhqot’in and other Indigenous groups. Accordingly, the Court considered the 
division of powers and interjurisdictional immunity in respect of Aboriginal title and 
rights. On the issue of how the province could legislate in respect of title lands, the 
Court held that provincial legislation of general application would apply to land held 
under Aboriginal title up to the point of infringement. According to the Court, 
section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 imposes limits on both provincial and 
federal governments such that “[n]either level of government is permitted to legislate 
in a way that results in a meaningful diminution of an Aboriginal or treaty right, 
unless such an infringement is justified in the broader public interest and is 
consistent with the Crown’s fiduciary duty owed to the Aboriginal group.”46 As such, 
contrary to preceding case law, provinces would now be entitled to use the Sparrow 
justification and infringement framework. 
The Court held that there is no role for the doctrine of interjurisdictional 
immunity or the “idea that Aboriginal rights are at the core of the federal power over 
“Indians” under s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867.” 47  In reaching this 
conclusion, the Court expressly overrode Morris on the issue of interjurisdictional 
immunity: McLachlin CJ stated that: 
To the extent that Morris stands for the proposition that provincial 
governments are categorically barred from regulating the exercise of 
Aboriginal rights, it should no longer be followed. I find that, consistent 
with the statements in Sparrow and Delgamuukw, provincial regulation of 
                                                
43 Tsilhqot’in, supra note 1 (Factum of the Appellant at paras 248, 256). 
44 Ibid at para 257. 
45 Ibid at para 262 [emphasis in original]. 
46 Tsilhqot’in, supra note 1 at para 139. 
47 Ibid at para 140. 
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general application will apply to exercises of Aboriginal rights, including 
Aboriginal title land, subject to the s. 35 infringement and justification 
framework. This carefully calibrated test attempts to reconcile general 
legislation with Aboriginal rights in a sensitive way as required by s. 35 of 
the Constitution Act, 1982 and is fairer and more practical from a policy 
perspective than the blanket inapplicability imposed by the doctrine of 
interjurisdictional immunity.48 
Consequently, the Tsilhqot’in decision reduced Indigenous Peoples’ ability to rely on 
the federal government’s exclusive legislative authority when provinces seek to 
enact legislation affecting Aboriginal title and rights. As will be discussed further, 
the decision also raises significant questions about how the Court will approach 
issues related to the division of powers and interjurisdictional immunity in the future.  
B. The Grassy Narrows Decision 
1. Background 
The Grassy Narrows appeal was heard by the Supreme Court in May 2014 and 
decided in July, shortly after the release of Tsilhqot’in. The litigation centred on the 
issue of what limits exist on provinces that seek to “take up” land for forestry and 
other purposes pursuant to the numbered treaties. The litigation was initiated by 
Grassy Narrows First Nation, descendants of the Anishinaabe signatories to Treaty 3. 
Treaty 3 was one of a series of a series of numbered treaties were negotiated by 
Canada between 1817 and 1921. As with most of the other numbered treaties, Treaty 
3 allowed for the ‘taking up’ of lands for non-Indigenous settlement, mining, 
lumbering and other purposes. In 2005, Grassy Narrows commenced the litigation by 
challenging the authorizations issued by Ontario in 1997 for forestry activities in 
Treaty 3 lands. Grassy Narrows argued that the authorizations violated the Treaty 3 
harvesting rights and that Ontario was not authorized to take up treaty lands so as to 
limit treaty rights without federal authorization. 
At trial the judge confirmed the Anishinaabe understanding that Treaty 3 
was made with Canada, not Ontario. The trial judge went on to find that this, coupled 
with Canada’s exclusive responsibility for “Indians, and lands reserved for the 
Indians” under section 91(24) meant that only Canada had the right to make 
decisions or legislate so as to significantly affect the exercise of treaty rights. The 
Court of Appeal disagreed and held instead, based primarily on St Catherine’s 
Milling,49 that Ontario’s ownership of Crown lands in Treaty 3 meant that there was 
no remaining role for the federal government in land-use decisions affecting treaty 
rights. The Court concluded that Ontario was entitled to “‘stand in Canada’s shoes’ 
for the purposes of recognizing the rights of First Nations” in respect of treaty 
                                                
48 Ibid at para 150. 
49 St Catherine’s Milling and Lumber Co v R (1888), 14 App Cas 46 (JCPC). 
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lands. 50  Grassy Narrows, along with its neighbour Wabauskang First Nation, 
appealed the decision to the Supreme Court. 
2. Submissions on the Division of Powers 
The question of whether Ontario could legislate so as to impair the federal 
government’s jurisdiction over treaty rights pursuant to section 91(24) was among 
the central issues before the Supreme Court in Grassy Narrows and the primary issue 
advanced by Wabauskang. At the Supreme Court, Wabauskang argued that the Court 
of Appeal erred by failing to confirm the federal government’s role in implementing 
Treaty 3 based in part on Canada’s exclusive responsibility for “Indians and lands 
reserved for the Indians” pursuant to section 91(24). Wabauskang argued that the 
Court of Appeal failed to recognize “that before it could consider whether or not 
Ontario [was] entitled to exercise the [Treaty 3] take up clause, it first had to 
determine whether” Ontario was acting within its constitutional jurisdiction.51 
Wabauskang rejected the Court of Appeal’s “erroneous conclusion that 
through an amorphous process of ‘constitutional evolution’ Canada’s exclusive 
jurisdiction under section 91(24) [was] curtailed and Ontario has ‘stepped into the 
shoes of Canada’ to fulfil the solemn treaty promises made to the Ojibway in 1873” 
pursuant to Treaty 3.52 Instead, Wabauskang argued that the federal government’s 
exclusive jurisdiction under section 91(24), including its obligations relating to the 
protection of treaty rights, had been recognized and remained central to Canada’s 
constitutional framework.53 Wabauskang further argued based on Canadian Western 
Bank, Morris, and other recent Supreme Court decisions that the doctrine of 
interjurisdictional immunity operates where provincial legislation would impair the 
core of federal jurisdiction. If the provincial forestry legislation at issue in Grassy 
Narrows impaired the federal government’s exclusive jurisdiction under section 
91(24), it would “be rendered inapplicable to the extent of the impairment.”54 The 
question of whether the legislation infringed the treaty right and whether the 
province could justifiably infringe that right could only arise when and if it was 
confirmed that the province was acting pursuant to valid constitutional authority.  
3. The Decision 
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the Court of Appeal’s decision. 
Based on its interpretation of Treaty 3 and the constitutional division of powers the 
Court held that only Ontario has the power to unilaterally exercise the Treaty 3 take 
up clause. In reaching its conclusion, the Court determined, contrary to the views of 
                                                
50 Keewatin v Ontario (Natural Resources), 2013 ONCA 158 at para 198, 114 OR (3d) 401. 
51 Grassy Narrows, supra note 1 (Factum of the Appellant Wabauskang at para 33). 
52 Ibid at para 35. 
53 Ibid at para 36. 
54 Ibid at para 106. 
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the Indigenous parties, that the numbered treaties were with the Crown, not the 
federal government, and that provinces could “stand in Canada’s shoes” with respect 
to the fulfilment of treaty rights.55 According to the Court, the level of government 
that exercised rights or performed obligations under the treaty was determined by the 
division of powers and Ontario alone by virtue of sections 109, 92A, and 92(5) of the 
Constitution Act, 1867 had the ability to take up Treaty 3 lands and to regulate those 
lands in accordance with the Treaty and its obligations under section 35.56 
The Court further confirmed that that the doctrine of interjurisdictional 
immunity no longer applies to limit a province’s legislative authority to interfere 
with the exercise of treaty rights. The Court held that Tsilhqot’in was a “full answer” 
to the question of whether provincial laws that affect treaty rights are inapplicable.57 
Provinces are now entitled to take up treaty lands up to the point of there being no 
meaningful ability left for Indigenous Peoples to exercise their treaty rights, provided 
that they fulfil the duty to consult and, if necessary, justify infringements under the 
Sparrow/Badger analysis.58 
The Grassy Narrows decision, while unsurprising in light of Tsilhqot’in, 
raises a number of unanswered questions in respect of the division of powers and 
federal authority pursuant to section 91(24). In particular, it remains unclear how the 
Constitution can ‘evolve’ so as to eliminate longstanding federal authority over 
specific heads of power, and how the Court’s previous decisions on the ongoing role 
and relevance of interjurisdictional immunity are to be reconciled with Tsilhqot’in 
and Grassy Narrows. These issues and their potential ramifications will be discussed 
in Part Three. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS 
Tsilhqot’in and Grassy Narrows are likely to result in significant uncertainty, both in 
respect of the type of protections Indigenous Peoples can expect for their 
constitutionally-guaranteed rights and how the Supreme Court will approach issues 
of constitutional interpretation and the division of powers going forward. 
A. Impacts for Indigenous Peoples 
1. Purpose of Section 91(24) 
In Tsilhqot’in and Grassy Narrows, the Court significantly restricted the federal 
government’s exclusive jurisdiction to regulate Aboriginal and treaty rights and in so 
                                                
55 Grassy Narrows, supra note 1 at paras 30, 44. 
56 Ibid at para 53. 
57 Ibid at paras 33, 53. 
58 Ibid at para 53. 
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doing removed an established aspect of constitutional protection formerly guaranteed 
to Indigenous Peoples. The Court’s decisions disregard the long-established purpose 
of federal exclusivity pursuant to section 91(24) and Indigenous Peoples’ view of 
their relationship with Canada. As noted, a key underlying purpose of the federal 
government’s responsibilities pursuant to section 91(24) was to effectively place the 
federal government between Indigenous Peoples and local settler populations, 
thereby ensuring the ongoing protection of Aboriginal and treaty rights. In the 
modern context of ever-increasing pressure for the use and development of 
Indigenous lands, the need to protect Indigenous Peoples’ rights and resources from 
the assimilative pressures of settler society remains as relevant today as it was in 
1867. By narrowing interjurisdictional immunity in respect of section 91(24), the 
Tsilhqot’in and Grassy Narrows decisions ignore the historical and continued 
importance of the federal government’s exclusive authority to honour and regulate 
Aboriginal and treaty rights. 
The decisions also stand in direct contradiction to many Indigenous 
Peoples’ understanding of their relationship with the Crown. Indigenous Peoples 
across Canada have long understood that their relationship originated and continues 
to be with the Crown in right of Canada, and that they are accordingly entitled to 
look to Canada to fulfil the Crown’s obligations. This issue was addressed by the 
English Court of Appeal in Secretary of State.59 In relation to Canada’s obligation to 
uphold the Crown’s promises to Indigenous Peoples, the Court held that the promise 
to respect and protect Aboriginal and treaty rights had passed from the Crown in 
respect of the United Kingdom to the Crown in respect of Canada, not the provinces: 
There is nothing, so far as I can see, to warrant any distrust by the Indians 
of the Government of Canada. But, in case there should be, the discussion 
in this case will strengthen their hand so as to enable them to withstand 
any onslaught. They will be able to say that their rights and freedoms have 
been guaranteed to them by the Crown—originally by the Crown in 
respect of the United Kingdom—now by the Crown in respect of 
Canada—but, in any case, by the Crown. No Parliament should do 
anything to lessen the worth of these guarantees. They should be honoured 
by the Crown in respect of Canada “so long as the sun rises and the river 
flows.” That promise must never be broken.60 
The English Court of Appeal’s decision has subsequently been relied on in Canada in 
support of the principle that since 1867, the Crown in right of Canada is responsible 
for fulfilling promises to Indigenous Peoples.61 The Supreme Court’s 2014 decisions 
to unilaterally absolve Canada of its exclusive responsibilities pursuant to section 
91(24) contradicted the English Court of Appeal’s promise and disregarded 
Indigenous Peoples’ view of their relationship with the Crown. 
                                                
59 R v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ex parte Indian Association of Alberta 
and others, [1982] 2 All ER 118. 
60 Ibid at 129–130 [emphasis added]. 
61 Campbell et al v AG BC/AG Cda & Nisga'a Nation et al, 2000 BCSC 1123 at para 82, [2000] 4 CNLR 
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Among the most troubling aspects of Tsilhqot’in and Grassy Narrows is the 
Court’s failure to provide a reasoned explanation for the decision to ignore the 
historical purpose of section 91(24) and the Indigenous viewpoint. In contrast, the 
Court relied heavily on history and the original intent in another recent decision 
nullifying the appointment of Justice Nadon on the basis that he did not meet the 
requirement that seats reserved on the Court for Quebec be member of the Quebec 
Bench or Quebec bar.62 Indigenous people are left nonplussed with the apparent 
double-standard. The precedent created in Tsilhqot’in and Grassy Narrows puts at 
risk the established special relationship between Indigenous Peoples and the federal 
government, a relationship grounded in the Royal Proclamation of 1763. The 
decisions now stand to be relied on across the country as a basis on which to re-write 
the Constitution so as to undermine Canada’s exclusive responsibilities to 
Indigenous Peoples. 
2. Increased Provincial Power 
For Indigenous Peoples, governments, and resource development companies alike, 
an immediate impact of Tsilhqot’in and Grassy Narrows will be the significant 
expansion of provincial authority to legislate in ways that could infringe the rights of 
Indigenous Peoples. By narrowing the operation of interjurisdictional immunity in 
respect of section 91(24), the Court also authorized provinces to enact legislation 
affecting Aboriginal and treaty rights in the absence of federal oversight. This shift 
stands in direct contradiction of established case law on the role of interjurisdictional 
immunity and the protection of Aboriginal and treaty rights. 
Prior to 2014, the Supreme Court dealt explicitly with the question of 
provincial access to the infringement/justification regime in Morris. There the Court 
held conclusively that only the federal government could infringe the 
constitutionally-protected rights of Indigenous peoples.63  
Implicit in this conclusion was the acknowledgement that provinces are ill-
positioned to take the steps necessary to justify infringements of Aboriginal and 
treaty rights. Unlike the federal government, provinces are closely tied to resource 
development and face additional and intensive pressures from local populations 
which militate against upholding the honour of the Crown. The Court’s 2014 
decisions ignore the inherent conflict which arises when provinces, heavily 
influenced by economic imperatives, are tasked with justifying infringements 
resulting from decisions to exploit Indigenous lands.  
The Sparrow/Badger test is based on the expectation that the manifestation 
of the Crown burdened with carrying out justification measures will uphold its 
promises and act honourably. Provinces are under considerable pressure to water 
down these constitutional obligations. One need only look to the hundreds of court 
cases launched by Indigenous Peoples across the country challenging decisions 
                                                
62 Reference re Supreme Court Act, ss 5 and 6, 2014 SCC 21, [2014] 1 SCR 43. 
63 Morris, supra note 28 at para 55. 
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affecting Aboriginal and treaty rights for confirmation that the provinces have and 
are likely to continue to have a particularly poor track record with respect to the 
infringement of Indigenous Peoples’ constitutionally-protected rights. Until 2014, 
the federal government’s exclusive jurisdiction pursuant to section 91(24) acted as a 
necessary check on provincial power. 
The Supreme Court’s 2014 decisions suggest a significant expansion of 
provincial authority, including in respect of provincial property rights. An important 
pre-2014 corollary of the federal government’s exclusive legislative authority 
pursuant to section 91(24) was the principle that provincial property rights could not 
trump federal jurisdiction. Instead, the doctrine would operate to curtail the exercise 
of a province’s proprietary interests wherever they resulted in an unacceptable 
interference with the federal government’s exclusive jurisdiction regardless of 
whether the province exercised its powers pursuant to section 92(13) or another head 
of provincial power. 
As early as 1898 in the Fisheries Case the Privy Council confirmed the 
practical effect of Canada’s exclusive jurisdiction under section 91. Based on the 
division of powers, it was legally permissible for Canada to exercise its exclusive 
authority in such a way so as to virtually confiscate provincial property: 
The suggestion that the power might be abused so as to amount to a 
practical confiscation of property does not warrant the imposition by the 
courts of any limit upon the absolute power of legislation conferred.  The 
supreme legislative power in relation to any subject-matter is always 
capable of abuse, but it is not to be assumed that it will be improperly 
used; if it is, the only remedy is an appeal to those by whom the legislature 
is elected.64 
Over 30 years after the Fisheries Case, the Supreme Court confirmed in Reference re 
Waters and Water-Powers the same point and observed that there was no legal 
remedy for a province whose right to the underlying beneficial interest in lands had 
been rendered practically useless as a consequence of Canada’s exercise of exclusive 
legislative authority: 
This, of course, is not to say that the Dominion in exercising its legislative 
authority under section 91, may not legislate in such a way as to affect the 
proprietary rights of a province. It is plain that in consequence of 
legislation on the subject, for example, of Fisheries, the provinces may be 
very greatly restricted in the exercise of their proprietary rights; but so 
long as the Dominion legislation truly concerns the subject of “Fisheries,” 
as that subject is envisaged by section 91, such legislation has the force of 
law, however harmful, or even foolish, it may appear to be. Within the 
limits of the subject matters assigned to it, the authority of the Dominion is 
supreme, and no court of justice has jurisdiction to take cognizance of any 
complaint that such authority has been abused. 
                                                
64 Attorney-General for the Dominion of Canada v Attorneys-General for the Provinces of Ontario, 
Quebec and Nova Scotia, [1898] AC 700 (PC) at 713 [Fisheries Case]. 
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… the proprietary rights of the provinces may be prejudicially affected, 
even to the point of rendering them economically valueless, through the 
exercise by the Dominion of its exclusive and plenary powers of 
legislation under the enumerated heads of section 91.65 
Importantly, the reasoning from the Fisheries Case and its predecessors was 
subsequently adopted by the Supreme Court in Sparrow in relation to section 91(24). 
More recently, the Court continued to recognize that the federal 
government’s exclusive legislative jurisdiction could impose limits on provincial 
authority over property. For example, the Court in Lafarge specifically noted that 
“Property and Civil Rights in the Province” was subject to the doctrine of 
interjurisdictional immunity.66 As such, interjurisdictional immunity would operate 
to protect the core federal competency even where doing so would limit the exercise 
of provincial property rights.67 Prior to 2014 it was apparent that interjurisdictional 
immunity would continue to uphold exclusive federal legislative responsibility for 
Aboriginal and treaty rights by limiting the scope of provincial jurisdiction over 
property. However, rather than maintaining this important constitutional protection, 
the Supreme Court in Tsilhqot’in and Grassy Narrows shifted the balance of power 
dramatically in favour of provincial property authority.  
Early decisions since Tsilhqot’in and Grassy Narrows suggest that courts 
are relying on the decisions as basis to affirm the expansion of provincial jurisdiction 
over Aboriginal and treaty rights, and by extension, land and resource development. 
For example, in 2014 the Federal Court dismissed an application by the Athabasca 
Chipewyan First Nation (ACFN) challenging the federal government decisions 
approving the Shell Jackpine project.68 The Court held that the “federal-provincial 
distribution of powers limited the Crown’s ability to accommodate the ACFN” and 
that the accommodations sought by the ACFN were outside of the federal Crown’s 
jurisdiction and should be addressed through consultation with Alberta because 
Alberta enjoyed exclusive jurisdiction over the use of provincial lands.69 Even the 
2016 Daniels decision, in which the Court ostensibly expanded the application of 
section 91(24) to Métis and non-status Indians, is of diminished significance in light 
of the significant limitations placed on the role of the federal government as a result 
of Tsilhqot’in and Grassy Narrows.  
The 2014 Supreme Court decisions leave unanswered questions regarding 
the regulation of Indigenous lands and rights and what role, if any, remains for 
                                                
65 Reference re: Waters and Water-Powers, [1929] SCR 200 at 212, 219, [1929] 2 DLR 481. 
66 Lafarge, supra note 22 at para 4. 
67 Ibid; Fisheries Case, supra note 64; Reference re Waters and Water-Powers, supra note 65. 
68 Adam v Canada (Environment), 2014 FC 1185 [Adams]. See also Peter Ballantyne Cree Nation v 
Canada (Attorney General), 2014 SKQB 327, in which the Court held at para 117 that post-Tsilhqot’in, 
provinces could now infringe Aboriginal rights subject only to the Sparrow/Badger infringement 
analysis. 
69 Adam, supra note 68 at paras 92, 94. 
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section 91(24). In particular, the Court’s conclusion that Morris is no longer valid in 
relation to interjurisdictional immunity and section 91(24) calls into question 
whether other decisions on the division of powers and the regulation of Aboriginal 
and treaty rights remain good law. For example, will the Court’s decisions in 
Derrickson and Paul, dealing with the right to regulate family property on reserve, 
still stand?70 If not, are provinces now entitled to regulate other areas that have 
always been the within the exclusive purview of the federal government? Does the 
Court’s overruling of Morris now mean that its affirmation of the ongoing relevance 
of interjurisdictional immunity in Canadian Western Bank and Lafarge are also no 
longer to be followed? And if this is not the case, has the Court created a double 
standard wherein it will continue to recognize interjurisdictional immunity in relation 
to some heads of power but not federal protections for Indigenous Peoples? 
Tsilhqot’in and Grassy Narrows are silent on these issues. 
Importantly, the provinces might ultimately rue the day the Court changed 
the law on the division of powers and section 91(24). The corollary of broadened 
provincial legislative jurisdiction is greater constitutional responsibility. As the Court 
explained in Tsilhqot’in, justifying an infringement of a section 35 right is no easy 
task. Except for instances where lands are being taken up, i.e. put to a visibly 
incompatible use, based on Grassy Narrows it is now arguable that the provinces 
must also obtain First Nation consent or justify infringements of treaty rights. It is 
also arguable that the provinces have clear responsibility for fulfilling outstanding 
treaty promises and cannot simply hide behind the federal government’s inaction. 
For example, there is no principled reason for the provinces to refuse to negotiate 
with First Nations for loss of use compensation based on outstanding treaty land 
entitlements. At a minimum, the cost of enjoying the use and benefit of Crown lands 
under section 92 of the Constitution should include responsibility for ensuring treaty 
obligations are promptly fulfilled. 
B. Cooperative Federalism & Interjurisdictional Immunity 
The Supreme Court’s abrupt departure from established case law calls into question 
how the Court will deal with issues of constitutional interpretation, cooperative 
federalism and the division of powers in the future. While in recent years the Court 
has been reluctant to broaden the application of the doctrine of interjurisdictional 
immunity, it has confirmed that “the text and logic of our federal structure justifies 
the application of interjurisdictional immunity to certain federal “activities”,” and 
that the doctrine continues to have a role in respect of the proper functioning of the 
division of powers.71 There is no explanation in either decision as to why the Court 
in 2014 chose to ignore its own reasoning and narrow federal exclusivity pursuant to 
section 91(24). 
                                                
70 The 2014 decisions also raise the related issue of how paramountcy will operate, particularly in the 
context of reserves and modern treaties where issues such as zoning arise. 
71 Canadian Western Bank, supra note 11 at para 42. 
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In addition, the decisions are counter to principles of cooperative federalism 
which have been expressly endorsed by the Court. In recent decisions the Court has 
emphasized an approach to federalism which “accommodates overlapping 
jurisdiction and encourages intergovernmental cooperation.” 72  Cooperative 
federalism requires a balance between federal and provincial jurisdiction which 
“allows the federal Parliament and the provincial legislatures to act effectively in 
their respective spheres.” 73  In Tsilhqot’in and Grassy Narrows the Court was 
presented with an opportunity to embrace an inclusive form of cooperative 
federalism which includes a role for both federal and provincial jurisdictions in 
respect of Aboriginal and treaty rights. In Grassy Narrows, for example, 
Wabauskang argued that viable options existed for Canada and Ontario to exercise 
their respective constitutional powers over treaty rights and forestry “harmoniously, 
in the spirit of cooperative federalism”74 provided that there was sufficient political 
will, intergovernmental cooperation, and legislative and regulatory drafting to 
“embrace the principles of flexible, cooperative federalism.”75 Such an approach 
would have preserved the role of section 91(24) while leaving the door open for the 
valid exercise of provincial authority. Instead, the Court chose to return to Lord 
Atkin’s “water-tight compartments” approach in relation to sections 92(5) and 92A 
of the Constitution by completely removing the federal government’s exclusive 
responsibilities in favour of expanded provincial jurisdiction.76  
In rejecting cooperative federalism, the Court also ignored the fact that 
workable examples exist which respect the division of powers and preserve 
interjurisdictional immunity. For example, since 1898, the federal and provincial 
governments have worked together to respect the division of powers in the fisheries 
context to develop and implement a workable regulatory scheme.77 The regulatory 
scheme has been recognized by the courts as a constitutionally-valid example of 
cooperative federalism.78 A similar arrangement exists in respect of provincial 
                                                
72 Reference re Securities Act, 2011 SCC 66 at para 57, [2011] 3 SCR 837 [Reference Re Securities Act]. 
73 Grassy Narrows, supra note 1 (Factum of the Appellant Wabauskang at para 88); see also Reference re 
Securities Act, supra note 72 at paras 7, 9. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Kerry Wilkins, “Dancing in the Dark: Of Provinces and Section 35 Rights After 2010” (2011) 54 SCLR 
(2d) 529 at 556. 
76 Attorney-General for Canada v Attorney-General for Ontario, [1937] AC 326 at 354. 
77 Following the decision in the Fisheries Case, Parliament enacted fisheries legislation and included 
provisions that enabled the Governor in Council to make fisheries regulations in relation to each 
province. See section 43(1) of the Fisheries Act, RSC 1985, c F-14.  These regulations sub-delegate to 
provincial Ministers the administration of the regulations.  For instance, in Ontario the relevant 
legislation is the Ontario Fishery Regulations, 2007, SOR/2007-237.  The Ontario Fishery Regulations 
are administered by the Ministry of Natural Resources under the Fish and Wildlife Conservation Act, 
1997, SO 1997, c 41, and its regulations.  The validity of this sub-delegation was upheld by both the 
Ontario Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada in Re Peralta et al and The Queen in right of 
Ontario et al, Peralta et al v Warner et al (1985), 49 OR (2d) 705, 1985 CanLII 2082 (Ont CA), aff’d in 
Peralta v Ontario, [1988] 2 SCR 1045, 66 OR (2d) 543. 
78 Jackson v Ontario (Natural Resources), 2009 ONCA 846 at para 7. 
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enforcement of the provisions of federal legislation regarding migratory birds.79 In 
both cases, the federal and provincial governments can legislate pursuant to valid 
constitutional authority provided that one does not unacceptably interfere with the 
other. The same opportunity existed in Grassy Narrows and Tsilhqot’in to develop 
cooperative schemes which would allow the provincial and federal governments to 
legislate within their own respective constitutional spheres while maintaining federal 
exclusivity in respect of section 91(24). Notably, in other recent decisions the Court 
has continued to acknowledge the importance of cooperative federalism outside the 
context of section 91(24). In its 2015 decision regarding the federal long-gun 
registry, for example, the Court expressly endorsed the principles of cooperative 
federalism as a means “to facilitate interlocking federal and provincial legislative 
schemes” and to “justify relaxing a rigid, watertight compartments approach to the 
division of legislative power.”80 The Court’s affirmation of the importance of 
cooperative federalism in relation to the long-gun registry makes its rejection of 
these principles in respect of section 91(24) all the more anomalous.  
The Court’s decision to overrule preceding decisions on the division of 
powers and interjurisdictional immunity without a reasoned explanation is 
surprising. The Court has been clear in previous decisions that while it is possible for 
the Court to overrule its own precedent, it will not do so lightly. In 2011 Rothstein J 
explained that “in order to overrule its own precedent, the Court must be satisfied, 
based upon substantial reasons, that the precedent was wrongly decided” and that 
“[t]here must be compelling reasons to justify overruling.”81 The 2014 decisions 
overrule a key aspect of Morris and call into question numerous other decisions of 
the Court but are silent on why provinces are now authorized to regulate Aboriginal 
and treaty rights and apply what would be otherwise inapplicable legislation. 
V. CONCLUSION  
Prior to 2014, the Court repeatedly confirmed the ongoing relevance and importance 
of interjurisdictional immunity, including with respect to section 91(24). In 
Tsilhqot’in and Grassy Narrows, however, the Court carved out an exception to its 
long-standing application of constitutional principles by narrowing federal 
exclusivity in relation to Aboriginal and treaty rights in favour of significantly 
expanded provincial property rights. By doing so, the Court ignored the historical 
and continuing importance of Canada’s responsibilities under section 91(24) and the 
promises made to Indigenous Peoples by the English Court of Appeal at the time the 
Constitution was repatriated. Going forward, it remains unclear how the Court will 
approach the division of powers and what preceding decisions remain good law in 
respect of interjurisdictional immunity and section 91(24). For Indigenous Peoples, 
                                                
79 Migratory Birds Convention Act, 1994, SC 1994, c 22; Migratory Birds Regulations, CRC, c 1035; Fish 
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80 Quebec (AG) v Canada (AG), 2015 SCC 14 at para 17, [2015] 1 SCR 693. 
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the decisions mean they must now deal with the prospect of provincial governments 
attempting to justify decisions that infringe Aboriginal and treaty rights. 
 
